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1189 
NOTES 
Are They Dangerous Yet?: The Foreseeability of 
Dangerousness in Oklahoma’s Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment Law and Its Implications for Patient Due 
Process Rights  
At the beginning of November 2017, mental healthcare in Oklahoma was 
certainly in the news. By declaring that a “fee” on cigarettes was actually an 
unconstitutional tax, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had blown a $215 
million hole in the state budget.1 As the Oklahoma Legislature proceeded 
with its special session to fill—or maybe just paper over—said hole, the 
Oklahoma Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services 
(ODMHSAS) faced a $75 million budget cut2 from their Fiscal Year 2017 
operating budget of about $320,993,000.3 With only two months left in the 
year to make these cuts, ODMHSAS feared the only solution outside of 
new revenue was the cessation of all outpatient services.4  
The crisis was a perfect example of legislatorial mixed messages. In 
2016, the Oklahoma Legislature passed Oklahoma’s first involuntary 
outpatient commitment statutes.5 The legislature subsequently expanded the 
law to allow for the involuntary outpatient commitment of certain minors 
and the updated version of the statute went into effect on November 1, 
2017.6 The overall effect of the simultaneous budget cuts and statute 
implementation was that the legislature placed a greater demand on 
outpatient services just as its budget-making policies and squabbles 
threatened to decimate outpatient services altogether. 
Given the recent budget crisis and the existential threat it poses to 
outpatient services as a whole, it is perhaps no wonder that more people 
have not been talking about the apparently innocuous provisions the 
Oklahoma Legislature added to the Mental Health title of Oklahoma’s 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Naifeh v. State ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 2017 OK 63 ¶ 51, 400 P.3d 759, 775; 
Aaron Brilbeck, State Could Cut All Outpatient Mental Health & Substance Abuse 
Programs, OKLAHOMA NEWS 9 (Oct. 18, 2017), http://www.news9.com/story/36630437/ 
state-could-cut-all-outpatient-mental-health-substance-abuse-programs. 
 2. Brilbeck, supra note 1. 
 3. STATE OF OKLA., FISCAL YEAR EXECUTIVE BUDGET 2017, at 13 (2016), 
https://www.ok.gov/OSF/documents/bud17_tagged.pdf. 
 4. Brilbeck, supra note 1.  
 5. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2016). 
 6. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2017). 
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statutory code in 2016 and 2017.7 The new provisions consist of a 
definition for “assisted outpatient” along with an accompanying procedural 
statute. While the “assisted outpatient” verbiage may sound tame, these 
statutes actually permit the use of involuntary outpatient commitment in 
Oklahoma for the very first time.  
Historically, “involuntary commitment” meant inpatient commitment. If 
a person was mentally ill and dangerous, the state could get a court order to 
confine that individual in a psychiatric hospital against their will. Today, 
because mental health care systems across the country increasingly rely on 
outpatient treatment, states have begun to adopt involuntary outpatient 
commitment statutes. These laws permit courts to order patients to take 
psychotropic medications rather than be confined for treatment. 
Oklahoma’s “assisted outpatient” provision is modeled off of the most 
famous involuntary outpatient commitment statute in the country, a New 
York statute known as “Kendra’s Law.”8  
Although involuntary outpatient commitment might seem like a logical 
outgrowth of involuntary civil commitment, involuntarily committing an 
individual to outpatient treatment raises questions concerning patient rights 
and how imminently dangerous an individual must be to support a 
commitment order. Individuals eligible for involuntary civil commitment 
pose an immediate and foreseeable danger to themselves or others.9 In 
contrast to such imminently dangerous individuals, an individual is more 
remotely dangerous when they are not ill enough to be admitted to an 
inpatient unit but are simultaneously deemed ill enough to be involuntarily 
committed to outpatient treatment.10 For the purposes of this paper, the 
terms remotely dangerous and imminently dangerous will be used to 
distinguish between the foreseeability of dangerousness required to support 
an order for outpatient commitment in contrast to an order for inpatient 
commitment. Using these terms, a remotely dangerous individual is not 
presently dangerous like the imminently dangerous individual because the 
remotely dangerous individual’s mental illness is currently controlled by 
medication. However, a remotely dangerous individual has a documented 
history of violence toward themselves or others as well as a history of 
treatment non-compliance that may reasonably result in mental 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. 
 8. 18 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2015); see also NY/Kendra’s Law, 
MENTAL ILLNESS POLICY ORG., https://mentalillnesspolicy.org/kendraslaw.html (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2018). 
 9. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(13) (2011). 
 10. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2017). 
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deterioration and imminent dangerousness in the future. As a result, the 
danger a remotely dangerous individual poses is less foreseeable and more 
speculative than the danger an imminently dangerous person poses. 
Because a person who poses no danger to herself or others has the right to 
refuse mental health treatment, it is imperative that we ask how remotely 
dangerous a person ordered to involuntary outpatient treatment must be 
before the state has violated their due process rights and how far we are 
willing to stretch the “mentally ill and dangerous” standard in the name of 
broader societal safety. 
This Note will discuss the difficulties inherent in relying on a past 
history of dangerousness to support an order for the involuntary outpatient 
commitment of a remotely dangerous person. Part I will detail the 
constitutional protections individuals have in the involuntary inpatient 
commitment context as these constitutional standards are also the main 
protections in the involuntary outpatient commitment process. Part II will 
discuss the development of involuntary outpatient commitment laws and 
the particular types of psychiatric patients these laws are intended to target 
and treat. Next, Part III will analyze specific provisions of Oklahoma’s 
outpatient commitment law, including the scope of the law and the 
requirements the state must meet in order to obtain an outpatient 
commitment order. Part IV will consider the legality of outpatient 
commitment orders that are based on predictions of future dangerousness in 
light of the fact that individuals who are not dangerous have the right to 
refuse treatment. Finally, in the context of the individual’s right to refuse 
treatment, Part V will discuss the lack of enforcement mechanisms in 
Oklahoma’s outpatient commitment law and the implications this might 
have for individuals who wish to refuse treatment. 
I. Constitutional Protections in the Involuntary Commitment Context 
To understand the effect involuntary outpatient commitment laws have 
on mental health law and patient rights, it is first necessary to understand 
the constitutional requirements governing involuntary outpatient 
commitment. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court of the United States 
affirmed that a state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an 
individual is both mentally ill and dangerous before it may involuntary 
commit the individual to an inpatient unit.11  
                                                                                                                 
 11. Although the Court uses the less-specific phrase “involuntary commitment,” the 
cases all concern examples of involuntary inpatient commitment. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1192 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1189 
 
 
In O’Connor v. Donaldson, the Court held that proof of mental illness 
alone was not enough to support an involuntary commitment order.12 The 
O’Connor case concerned a man named Kenneth Donaldson who had been 
involuntary committed to an inpatient facility for fifteen years because his 
father believed he was suffering from “delusions.”13 At trial, Donaldson 
offered uncontradicted evidence that he had never been a danger to himself 
or others and that he could have supported himself outside the hospital.14 
Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that it would be 
“constitutionally permissible” for the state to involuntarily commit a non-
dangerous person for mental health treatment, the Supreme Court 
disagreed.15 Instead, the Court held that “[a] finding of ‘mental illness’ 
alone cannot justify a State’s locking a person up against his will and 
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. . . . [T]here is still 
no basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to no 
one and can live safely in freedom.”16 
After O’Connor affirmed that “dangerousness” was a necessary element 
for an involuntary inpatient commitment order, Foucha v. Louisiana 
affirmed that “mental illness” was also an indispensable element for 
confinement.17 The case turned on a Louisiana statute that allowed a person 
found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity to be confined for 
dangerousness even after a physician had recommended the person be 
released from custody because the person was no longer mentally ill.18 
Under the statute, the confined individual had the burden of proving that 
they were not dangerous.19 Terry Foucha suffered from a temporary, drug-
induced psychosis as well as an “anti-social personality” that was deemed 
not to be a mental illness.20 He contended that his confinement under the 
Louisiana statute violated his due process and equal protection rights.21 The 
                                                                                                                 
 12. 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).  
 13. Id. at 565–67. 
 14. Id. at 568. 
 15. Id. at 572–73. 
 16. Id. at 575 (emphasis added). The holding in O’Connor leaves open the possibility 
that a definite commitment could be supported on the finding of mental illness without a 
further finding of dangerousness. However, later cases refashioned the O’Connor case as 
holding that involuntary confinement of a non-dangerous mentally ill person is 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77 (1992). 
 17. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77. 
 18. Id. at 73. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 75. 
 21. Id. at 73. 
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Supreme Court held that there was no basis for the state to hold Foucha 
once he was no longer mentally ill.22 The state had to first release Foucha 
from custody and then civilly commit him; to do this, the state would have 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence in a civil commitment 
proceeding that Foucha was both mentally ill and dangerous.23  
As Foucha suggests, the standard of proof for involuntary inpatient 
commitment is clear and convincing evidence, rather than the 
preponderance of the evidence standard more typically required in civil law 
proceedings. In Addington v. Texas, the state of Texas sought to civilly 
commit a man who had a history of delusions and “assaultive episodes.”24 
The Texas trial court applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, but 
on appeal Addington argued that the correct standard of proof was the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard employed in criminal cases.25 
Concerned that it would be impossible to prove a person’s future 
dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, the Texas Supreme Court chose 
neither Addington’s nor the trial court’s standard.26 Instead, the court held 
that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof would not violate 
an individual’s due process rights in civil commitment cases.27 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Texas Supreme Court and 
upheld the trial court’s application of the clear and convincing evidence 
standard.28 The Court expressed concern about balancing the individual’s 
interest in not being indefinitely confined with the state’s interest in the care 
of “the emotionally disturbed.”29 It reiterated its continued holding that 
“civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of 
liberty that requires due process protection.”30 The Court held that due 
process requires “proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the 
evidence” because there is a risk that the factfinder might involuntarily 
commit an individual for “a few isolated instances of unusual conduct.”31 
With loss of liberty on the line, the Court concluded that society should 
assume the greater risk of error in the judgment.32 However, the Court also 
                                                                                                                 
 22. Id. at 78. 
 23. Id. 
 24. 441 U.S. 418, 420-21 (1979). 
 25. Id. at 421-22. 
 26. Id. at 422. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 428-29, 433. 
 29. Id. at 425. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 427. 
 32. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1194 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1189 
 
 
held that it was not necessary for the state to meet the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.33 It underscored the Texas Supreme Court’s concern about 
the speculative nature of proving future dangerousness and also reasoned 
that involuntary commitment proceedings were not punitive in nature and 
so should not require that the state meet a criminal standard of proof.34 
Taken together, these three cases highlight issues that are at the core of 
involuntary commitment generally, but which are magnified in importance 
when it comes to involuntary outpatient commitment, specifically. While 
the individual is not confined during involuntary outpatient treatment, there 
is still a liberty interest at risk in the process—the freedom to refuse 
psychotropic medication. Furthermore, the difficulty of proving future 
dangerousness becomes central to the discussion because of the very nature 
of involuntary outpatient commitment and the types of patients who would 
benefit from such assisted outpatient treatment in the first place. 
II. The Purpose of Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment Laws 
Involuntary outpatient commitment is designed for patients whose 
mental illnesses may be controlled by medication but who struggle with 
“treatment non-compliance” that results in a cycle of hospital admittances 
and discharges that can be hard on both the individual and their loved 
ones.35 Essentially, the pattern proceeds as follows: At some point, an 
individual becomes so seriously mentally ill that they are dangerous to 
themselves or others. Once they meet the “mentally ill and dangerous” 
standard, they are admitted to an inpatient facility.36 While there, they 
receive treatment. Often, this treatment takes the form of prescription 
medication that will substantially control the symptoms of their mental 
illness.37 For some individuals, the medication works so well that 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 431. 
 34. Id. at 428-29. 
 35. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(21) (Supp. 2017). According to the definition of 
“assisted outpatient treatment,” the purpose attributed to such treatment is “to treat an 
assisted outpatient's mental illness and to assist the person in living and functioning in the 
community, or to attempt to prevent a relapse or deterioration that may reasonably be 
predicted to result in suicide or the need for hospitalization.” Id.  
 36. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(13) (2011). Oklahoma’s definition for “person 
requiring treatment” incorporates the mentally ill and dangerous standard. An individual 
must meet the definition of “person requiring treatment” to be admitted to an inpatient 
facility. 
 37. See Jillane T. Hinds, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment for the Chronically 
Mentally Ill, 69 NEB. L. REV. 346, 367 (1990). 
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eventually they are no longer a danger to themselves or others. Because the 
individual no longer meets the “mentally ill and dangerous” standard, the 
patient is subsequently discharged from the inpatient facility.38 However, 
without the structure of the inpatient setting, the individual fails to take 
their medication for one reason or another and becomes “treatment non-
compliant.”39 Without their medication, the individual’s symptoms return 
until, eventually, the individual is ill enough and dangerous enough to be 
readmitted to an inpatient facility.40 Patients who struggle with this pattern 
of admittances and discharges have become known as “revolving door 
patients.”41 Involuntary outpatient commitment statutes were designed “for 
compelling treatment for those chronically mentally ill individuals who 
have a history of failing to continue taking antipsychotic medication 
voluntarily or consistently and who, without medication, would predictably 
require inpatient hospitalization again in the future.”42 
Treatment non-compliance can occur for a number of reasons. For 
example, some individuals simply may not want to take their medication 
while some may refuse medication for religious reasons.43 Some individuals 
may believe they are no longer mentally ill and so no longer need their 
medication.44 Additionally, psychotropic medication may cause some 
individuals to experience adverse side effects.45 Sometimes those side 
effects are bad enough that the individual may choose to deal with the 
symptoms of their mental illness rather than continue their treatment.46 
Furthermore, some individuals experience challenges related to mobility. 
For some patients, the struggle to get to an outpatient facility, attend 
appointments regularly, or pick up medication may make treatment 
compliance a feat not worth the effort.47 Sometimes individuals simply 
forget to take their medication, which can start a vicious cycle of mental 
deterioration and treatment non-compliance.48 As the individual 
increasingly experiences symptoms of mental illness, they may also find it 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(13) (2011). 
 39. Hinds, supra note 37, at 351. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 350-51; Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment: An Update, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 277, 278 (1990). 
 42. Hinds, supra note 37, at 352. 
 43. Id. at 372. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 372-73. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. at 352, 373. 
 48. Id. 
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increasingly difficult to remember to take their medication.49 While 
treatment non-compliance may occur for a variety of reasons, any one of 
the above reasons could be exacerbated if the individual does not have a 
support network of family and friends who can help them travel to and from 
their appointments, remind them to take their medication, and provide 
stability, encouragement, and understanding. 
Managing this treatment non-compliance on an outpatient basis has 
become especially important for mental health treatment systems because 
there exists a gap in care between inpatient and outpatient treatment that 
may endanger individuals receiving treatment as well as the public at large. 
While today inpatient treatment is reserved for the most acutely mentally ill 
individuals, this was not always the case. In 1950, Oklahoma had 6059 
hospital beds spread across its four state psychiatric hospitals.50 Griffin 
Memorial Hospital, the largest of the state psychiatric hospitals and the only 
one still offering comparable inpatient services, was home to 2936 of those 
beds.51 However, beginning around 1960 and accelerating during the 1980s, 
mental health systems around the country underwent a process called 
“deinstitutionalizion.”52 Mental health professionals reduced the inpatient 
populations of psychiatric hospitals and replaced those inpatient services 
with new outpatient services to varying effect.53 Today, Griffin Memorial 
Hospital has only 120 beds—a ninety-six percent reduction in inpatient 
capacity.54  
Because there are so few inpatient beds across the state, individuals may 
experience delays being admitted. Such delays can be especially dangerous 
when individuals need frequent admissions during a short period of time 
because delays may exacerbate gaps in their care. Furthermore, because 
space in inpatient facilities is limited, the standard for what mental health 
professionals consider “dangerous” enough for admittance may be quite 
high. For example, if a person hears voices directing them to harm or kill 
others but the person also appears to be capable of ignoring those voices, 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS OF THE FORTY-EIGHT 
STATES 38 (1950). 
 51. Id. at 235. 
 52. See Gerald N. Grob, From Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern 
America, 62 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 187 (1991); Sarah Capps, Continuity in Care: The History of 
Deinstitutionalization in Oklahoma’s Mental Healthcare System, U. OKLA. HIST. J., Spring 
2016, at 31, https://commons.shareok.org/bitstream/handle/11244.46/1251/OUHJ-Issue-5-
Spring-2016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 53. See Grob, supra note 52; Capps, supra note 52.  
 54. Capps, supra note 52, at 34. 
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that individual might not be considered dangerous enough to be admitted to 
an inpatient facility because auditory hallucinations alone might not prove 
that an individual is dangerous at all, let alone imminently dangerous.55  
Given the lack of inpatient space available and the high standard for 
dangerousness in the inpatient setting, it is important that Oklahoma’s 
mental healthcare system provides outpatient treatment options for 
individuals who still pose some danger but who do not yet meet the more 
stringent inpatient standard. In theory, involuntary outpatient commitment 
statutes help patients who are treatment non-compliant by ordering those 
patients to attend their outpatient treatment and to take their medication. 
This should prevent the cycle of deterioration as well as provide a treatment 
solution when a person has begun experiencing symptoms due to treatment 
non-compliance but is not yet dangerous enough to be admitted to an 
inpatient facility. 
III. The Structure and Scope of Oklahoma’s Involuntary 
Outpatient Commitment Statutes 
Oklahoma’s involuntary outpatient commitment statute is located in two 
separate places in title 43A of the Oklahoma Statutes. The first part of the 
law is the definition of “assisted outpatient,” which provides the scope of 
the law’s application.56 The technical aspects of the law, including 
procedural requirements, are located in a separate section of the title.57  
According to the definition of “assisted outpatient,” an individual must 
meet certain statutory requirements relating to their medical history and 
needs.58 To begin, they must be mentally ill.59 They must also be “unlikely 
                                                                                                                 
 55. This example is based on the author’s own experiences. The final determination 
concerning whether an individual is imminently dangerous will depend on the opinion of an 
examining mental health professional.  
 56. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2017). 
 57. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416 (Supp. 2016). 
 58. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20)-(21) (Supp. 2017). 
 20. ‘Assisted outpatient’ means a person who: 
  a. is either currently under the care of a facility certified by the Department 
of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services as a Community Mental 
Health Center, or is being discharged from the custody of the Oklahoma 
Department of Corrections, or is being discharged from a residential placement 
by the Office of Juvenile Affairs, 
 b. is suffering from a mental illness, 
 c. is unlikely to survive safely in the community without supervision, based 
on a clinical determination, 
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to survive safely in the community without supervision, based on a clinical 
determination.”60 The statute does not define “safely,” and for this reason 
the word could conceivably encompass a wide variety of dangers, including 
suicidality, mental deterioration that leads to physical deterioration, 
physical harm to others, or possibly even behaviors that do not involve 
physical harm to anyone if those behaviors threaten a negative change in 
status, such as incarceration. The individual also must be “unlikely to 
voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment that would enable him or her 
to live safely in the community” as a result of their mental illness.61 
Additionally, the individual must require involuntary outpatient treatment 
“to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be likely to result in 
serious harm” to themselves or others.62 The individual must also be “likely 
to benefit from assisted outpatient treatment.”63 This requirement creates 
                                                                                                                 
 d. has a history of lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that 
has: 
 (1) prior to the filing of a petition, at least twice within the last thirty-six 
(36) months been a significant factor in necessitating hospitalization or 
treatment in a hospital or residential facility, or receipt of services in a forensic 
or other mental health unit of a correctional facility, or a specialized treatment 
plan for treatment of mental illness in a secure juvenile facility or placement in 
a specialized residential program for juveniles, or 
 (2) prior to the filing of the petition, resulted in one or more acts of serious 
violent behavior toward self or others or threats of, or attempts at, serious 
physical harm to self or others within the last twenty-four (24) months, 
 e. is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely to voluntarily 
participate in outpatient treatment that would enable him or her to live safely in 
the community, 
 f. in view of his or her treatment history and current behavior, is in need of 
assisted outpatient treatment in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which 
would be likely to result in serious harm to the person or persons as defined in 
this section, and 
 g. is likely to benefit from assisted outpatient treatment; and 
 21. ‘Assisted outpatient treatment’ means outpatient services which have 
been ordered by the court pursuant to a treatment plan approved by the court to 
treat an assisted outpatient's mental illness and to assist the person in living and 
functioning in the community, or to attempt to prevent a relapse or 
deterioration that may reasonably be predicted to result in suicide or the need 
for hospitalization. 
Id. 
 59. Id. § 1-103(20)(b). 
 60. Id. § 1-103(20)(c). 
 61. Id. § 1-103(20)(e). 
 62. Id. § 1-103(20)(f). 
 63. Id. § 1-103(20)(g). 
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some sense that the treatment should be in the best interest of the individual 
or at least that an individual should not be involuntarily committed to 
outpatient treatment unless it will have some positive effect. 
However, before a person can be involuntarily committed to outpatient 
treatment, the individual must first meet the institutional requirements in 
the definition of “assisted outpatient.”64 To begin, the individual must be 
“currently under the care of a facility certified by the Oklahoma 
Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services (ODMHSAS) 
as a Community Mental Health Center,” be in the process of being 
“discharged from the custody of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections,” 
or be in the process of being “discharged from a residential placement by 
the Office of Juvenile Affairs.”65 Effectively, before an individual may 
qualify as an “assisted outpatient” the individual must either be someone 
who is already a consumer of Oklahoma’s outpatient mental health 
services—specifically at a community mental health center—or the 
individual must qualify for assisted outpatient treatment because of their 
history with either the Department of Corrections or the Office of Juvenile 
Affairs.  
Because of this first requirement, the definition of “assisted outpatient” 
does much to limit the scope of involuntary outpatient commitment in 
Oklahoma. If the individual must have a history at an ODMHSAS 
community mental health center or with either the Department of 
Corrections or the Office of Juvenile Affairs, it is unlikely that courts will 
order the involuntary outpatient commitment of an individual who has 
never been treated for mental illness before. Additionally, a court may not 
order the involuntary outpatient commitment of an individual who has had 
no prior contact with the state of Oklahoma. Individuals who have a history 
of treatment at community mental health centers or comparable agencies 
located in other states must establish a history of treatment or interaction 
with Oklahoma’s mental health system or state agencies before a court can 
order that they be involuntarily committed to outpatient treatment.  
Although the requirement that the individual have a history with an 
Oklahoma state agency substantially narrows the application of the law, the 
fact that one of those agencies is the Office of Juvenile Affairs broadens the 
application of the law where minors are concerned. Kendra’s Law, the New 
York statute on which Oklahoma’s definition of “assisted outpatient” is 
based, originally required that the individual be “eighteen years of age or 
                                                                                                                 
 64. Id. § 1-103(20). 
 65. Id. § 1-103(20)(a). 
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older.”66 When the bill was originally passed in Oklahoma in 2016, the 
legislature simply adopted New York’s age requirement.67 However, after 
the 2017 amendments to the statute, Oklahoma now allows certain minors 
to be involuntarily committed to outpatient treatment where other 
jurisdictions reserve outpatient commitment for adults.68 
The institutional limitations on the scope of Oklahoma’s involuntary 
outpatient commitment law serve a double function. First, they protect 
individuals from being involuntary committed to outpatient treatment when 
those individuals have had no contact with the state of Oklahoma 
concerning their mental health so that, presumably, the state knows 
relatively little about their illness. Second, limiting involuntary outpatient 
treatment to individuals who are already consumers of certain state services 
should save money in the already cash-strapped state budget when 
compared to an involuntary outpatient commitment law that does not 
contain such institutional limitations. Managing Oklahoma’s finite 
resources with institutional limitations became increasingly important after 
the legislature amended the law to remove the minority limitation.69  
In addition to these institutional limitations, to qualify as an “assisted 
outpatient” the individual must experience one of two possible triggering 
events. The first possible triggering event occurs when the individual’s 
treatment non-compliance necessitates “hospitalization or treatment in a 
hospital or residential facility, or receipt of services in a forensic or other 
mental health unit of a correctional facility, or a specialized treatment plan 
for treatment of mental illness in a secure juvenile facility or placement in a 
specialized residential program for juveniles” at least twice within the last 
thirty-six months before the petition for involuntary outpatient commitment 
is filed.70 In other words, a person can qualify for involuntary outpatient 
commitment when they have failed to take their medication and, because of 
this failure, needed some form of inpatient treatment twice within the last 
three years. The second possible triggering event occurs when the 
individual’s treatment non-compliance “resulted in one or more acts of 
                                                                                                                 
 66. 18 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 9.60(c)(1) (McKinney 2015). 
 67. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2016). 
 68. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (Supp. 2017). 
 69. See Brilbeck, supra note 1.  
 70. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20)(d)(1) (Supp. 2017). The Oklahoma Forensic Center is 
a psychiatric hospital for individuals who are acquitted not guilty by reason of insanity or 
who are adjudicated incompetent to stand trial. Oklahoma Forensic Center (OFC), 
OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES (Feb. 19, 
2019, 6:56 PM), https://ok.gov/odmhsas/Mental_Health/Oklahoma_Forensic_Center.html. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss4/6
2019]       NOTES 1201 
 
 
serious violent behavior . . . or threats of, or attempts at, serious physical 
harm” to themselves or others in the twenty-four months before the petition 
for involuntary outpatient commitment was filed.71 
IV. The Problem of Predicting Future Dangerousness 
These triggering events are important because they provide evidence that 
the individual poses a foreseeable risk of danger. If the individual, as a 
result of failing to take their medication, experienced past deterioration that 
required inpatient treatment, then this displays a pattern of behavior that 
will likely continue. The definition of “assisted outpatient” predicts that an 
individual who fails to take their medication will continue to do so and will 
deteriorate until they are a danger to themself or others. For example, the 
individual must be “unlikely to survive in the community without 
supervision,” “unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment,” 
“likely to benefit” from outpatient treatment, and be in need of such 
treatment to prevent relapse “in view of his or her treatment history and 
current behavior.”72 Surprisingly, nowhere in either the definition of 
“assisted outpatient” or in the procedures for involuntary outpatient 
commitment is there a requirement that the state demonstrate that the 
individual is currently refusing to take their medication or that the 
individual is currently deteriorating.73 While there is a suggestion that the 
individual’s current behavior will be considered during the process of 
ordering involuntary outpatient commitment, the statute does not elucidate 
what type or degree of behavior should satisfy a court that such an order is 
necessary and proper.74 When it comes to how foreseeable it is that an 
individual will pose a danger to themselves or others, there is quite a 
difference between an individual whose current behavior consists of 
statements that indicate their wish to refuse medication and current 
behavior which threatens immediate violence. Oklahoma tries to confront 
the foreseeability issue by requiring that the individual have a medical 
history that establishes a pattern of either inpatient treatment or violence 
because it appears to establish a pattern of dangerousness that echoes the 
“mentally ill and dangerous” standard without actually meeting it.75 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id. § 1-103(20)(d)(2). 
 72. Id. § 1-103 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id.; 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416 (Supp. 2016). 
 74. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103 (considering eligibility for assisted outpatient treatment 
“in view of his or her treatment history and current behavior”). 
 75. Id. § 1-103(20)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2017). 
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While using a past history of violence and inpatient admittances seems 
like a reasonable way to predict dangerousness, the difficulty is that an 
individual has the right to refuse medical treatment as long as that person is 
not a danger to themself or others. In Washington v. Harper, the United 
States Supreme Court held that “the Due Process Clause permits the State 
to treat a prison inmate who has a serious mental illness with antipsychotic 
drugs against his will, if the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and 
the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.”76 While this articulation 
appears to set out the familiar “mentally ill and dangerous” standard of 
involuntary inpatient commitment with the additional requirement of 
“medical appropriateness,” the Supreme Court altered the test slightly only 
two years later. In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court held that due process would 
have been satisfied if “treatment with antipsychotic medication was 
medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential 
for the sake of [petitioner’s] own safety or the safety of others.”77 Under the 
Riggins formulation, the state must show that it was “medically 
appropriate” to involuntarily administer the medication, that doing so was 
“essential” for the safety of the mentally ill individual or for the safety of 
others around them (implicitly because the individual is dangerous to some 
unspecified degree), and that the state considered less intrusive alternatives 
but found them to be insufficient.78 Although both Harper and Riggins 
involved criminal proceedings, they provide guidance concerning what due 
process requires in the context of civil commitment. 
V. “Assisted Outpatients” and Enforcing Treatment Compliance Without 
Imminent Dangerousness 
One of the most striking features of the Oklahoma involuntary outpatient 
commitment statute is how it acknowledges and affirms the right of 
individuals to refuse medication even as it creates a framework to force 
individuals to take medications when they are, by definition, not dangerous 
enough to meet the “mentally ill and dangerous” standard. A court “shall 
not order hospitalization” without considering the individual’s competency 
to refuse court-ordered treatment, “including, but not limited to, the rights 
of the consumer . . . [t]o refuse medications.”79 However, “[a] court may 
order the patient to self-administer psychotropic drugs or accept the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990). 
 77. 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 78. Id. at 135-37. 
 79. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416(A) (Supp. 2016). 
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administration of such drugs by authorized personnel,” and the order “may 
specify the type and dosage range of such psychotropic drugs.”80  
While the language of the statute does not track the requirements set out 
in Riggins, its requirements speak to each of the Riggins requirements. To 
begin, the licensed mental health professional who files the petition for 
assisted outpatient treatment must create a written treatment plan for the 
individual and “state facts which establish that such treatment is the least 
restrictive alternative” available for treating the individual.81 The definition 
of “assisted outpatient” tries to establish that the forced administration of 
medication is necessary for the safety of the individual or the safety of 
those around them by showing that the individual committed or threatened 
violence against themselves or others within the last two years or that the 
individual must have recently been found to be imminently dangerous 
because they were admitted to inpatient care twice within the last three 
years.82 The definition of “assisted outpatient” also seeks to establish that 
such treatment is “medically appropriate” by requiring evidence of the 
individual’s mental illness, history of treatment non-compliance, and need 
for outpatient treatment in which they are otherwise unlikely to voluntarily 
participate.83 The procedural statute also tries to ensure that the treatment is 
medically appropriate by limiting the temporal scope of the treatment; 
“[t]he initial order for assisted outpatient treatment shall be for a period of 
one (1) year.”84 While a licensed mental health professional may file a 
petition to extend the order beginning thirty days before the end of that 
year, the court considering the petition for extension must determine if the 
individual continues to meet the “criteria for assisted outpatient treatment” 
and if “such treatment is the least restrictive alternative.”85  
The initial one-year order and subsequent petition to extend does not 
sufficiently address the possibility that an individual who meets the 
definition of “assisted outpatient” may never become treatment compliant. 
It is not outside the realm of possibility that an assisted outpatient treatment 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. § 5-416(K). 
 81. Id. § 5-416(F), (I). While the statute merely says that this task falls to the 
“petitioner,” section 5-410(C) mandates that “[p]etitions filed to determine if an individual 
should be ordered to assisted outpatient treatment . . . shall only be filed by a licensed mental 
health professional employed by the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse 
Services or employed by a community mental health center certified by the Department.” Id. 
§ 5-410(C). 
 82. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20)(d)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2017). 
 83. Id. § 1-103(20). 
 84. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416(M) (Supp. 2016).  
 85. Id.  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1204 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1189 
 
 
order might extend for years, or for much of an individual’s life. If an 
individual who fits the pattern of a “revolving door patient” refuses take 
their medication or attend outpatient treatment, it is likely that they will 
continue to experience symptoms of mental illness. Based upon the fact that 
an individual must have experienced cyclical deterioration in the past in 
order to meet the definition of “assisted outpatient,” it is entirely possible 
that these symptoms will continue to cause the individual to relapse or 
deteriorate until they are dangerous.86 Although the statute requires ongoing 
evaluation of the appropriateness of the treatment, nothing in the statute 
prohibits the order for treatment to become what is effectively a standing 
outpatient treatment order that extends over the lifetime of the individual.87 
While the statute creates some procedural safeguards against this 
possibility, it contains no clear and enforceable limitations. Because the 
statute lacks such limitations, it elevates societal safety and normalizing 
notions of the assisted outpatient’s best interests over individual autonomy 
and the freedom to refuse medical treatment.  
Additionally, the statute does not contain adequately clear provisions for 
enforcing the involuntary administration of medication when the individual 
is not presently dangerous. The standards set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Riggins suggest that an individual should be a danger to 
themselves or others before the state orders medication to be forcefully 
administered.88 The requirement that the administration of medication be 
essential to protect the safety of the individual or the public suggests that 
the Court was referring to an imminently dangerous individual, but this is 
up for debate.89 For this reason, involuntary outpatient commitment statutes 
proceed into uncharted territory by allowing the forced medication of 
remotely dangerous individuals. Such statutes order the administration of 
medication as a preventive measure based on a pattern of behavior which 
suggests that the individual will become dangerous in the future. At the 
heart of the involuntary outpatient commitment statutes is a conflict 
between the right of non-dangerous mentally ill individuals to refuse 
medication and the overall goal of the statutes, which is to force individuals 
to become “treatment compliant” when the danger they pose is still remote.  
Oklahoma’s solution to this conundrum is, essentially, to give courts the 
power to order involuntary outpatient treatment but take away their most 
powerful enforcement mechanisms. The statute expressly says that 
                                                                                                                 
 86. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20)(1)-(2) (Supp. 2017). 
 87. See id. § 1-103; 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416 (Supp. 2016). 
 88. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 89. Id. at 135-37. 
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“[f]ailure to comply with an order of assisted outpatient treatment shall not 
be grounds for involuntary civil commitment or a finding of contempt of 
court.”90 In other words, an individual shall not be deemed to meet the 
“mentally ill and dangerous” standard simply because they refuse to comply 
with the involuntary outpatient commitment order. Refusal to comply with 
an assisted outpatient treatment order will lead to an individual’s 
involuntary inpatient commitment only when an “assisted outpatient 
appears to be a person requiring treatment.”91 A “person requiring 
treatment” is a technical term, essentially meaning an individual that is 
mentally ill and dangerous.92 Therefore, if the individual continues to refuse 
to comply with treatment even after the treatment has been ordered by the 
court, the court cannot find them in contempt and the individual cannot be 
moved to an inpatient treatment unit before they have relapsed or 
deteriorated to the point that they meet the “dangerous” criteria required for 
inpatient admission.  
The statute’s lack of enforcement power suggests that states are 
uncertain about what due process requirements constrain their involuntary 
outpatient commitment laws, given that such laws are relatively new 
creations and that the United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case on 
one.93 While the Supreme Court has ruled on the standards for involuntary 
inpatient commitment, the Court has not provided any guidance about how 
remotely dangerous an individual can be before the forced administration of 
medication becomes a violation of their liberty interest. To avoid violating 
the Fourteenth Amendment, states like Oklahoma and New York have 
adopted involuntary outpatient commitment laws with a compromised 
enforcement power.  
Although one may argue that designing statutes this way errs on the side 
of caution, such compromised enforcement power may still lead to due 
                                                                                                                 
 90. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416(Q) (Supp. 2016). 
 91. Id. § 5-416(P). 
 92. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(13) (2011). 
 93. In addition to Oklahoma, New York, and other states that have modelled their 
involuntary outpatient commitment statutes on Kendra’s Law, states like North Carolina and 
Hawai’i have expressly stated that individuals subject to an outpatient commitment order 
may not be forcibly medicated or forcibly detained for treatment. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-
416(Q) (Supp. 2016); 18 N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 2015); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a)(3) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-129(b) (2017). In these cases, 
the individual who refuses treatment must be involuntary committed to inpatient treatment 
before they may be forcibly medicated. This means that they must be imminently, rather 
than remotely dangerous. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-273(a)(3) (2004); HAW. REV. STAT. § 
334-129(b) (2017). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
1206 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:1189 
 
 
process issues. If an individual complies with a court order for involuntary 
outpatient commitment only because they incorrectly believed that the court 
or other authority had the power to enforce compliance, is it possible that 
the individual’s due process rights have still been violated? An individual’s 
effective exercise of their right to refuse treatment may be premised on the 
individual’s understanding that they have such a right in the first place.94  
Because issues of competency and financial dependence loom large in 
mental health law, it is necessary to consider what role involuntary 
outpatient commitment statutes give to the family and friends of the 
“assisted outpatient.” Simply because of the nature of some mental 
illnesses, some individuals may experience symptoms which may interfere 
with their ability to understand the legal and medical issues facing them.95 
Additionally, those same symptoms may make it difficult for the individual 
to maintain employment or to support themselves, thereby increasing their 
reliance on family and friends for support.96 When combined, this means 
that an individual may depend significantly on their family both to explain 
and to enforce their legal rights during an involuntary outpatient 
commitment proceeding.  
                                                                                                                 
 94. Consider, for example, what is almost certainly the most famous case to find a 5th 
Amendment violation due to a failure to warn individuals of their rights: Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (“[T]he defendant was questioned by police officers, 
detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside 
world. In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of his 
rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the questioning elicited oral 
admissions, and in three of them, signed statements as well which were admitted at their 
trials.”). 
 95. This is especially true for those illnesses which are most likely to lead to discussions 
of involuntary outpatient commitment.  
 96. Maintaining steady employment while controlling one’s mental illness is a common 
struggle and many organizations have resources to help individuals understand their options 
and legal rights. See, e.g., Depression, PTSD, & Other Mental Health Conditions in the 
Workplace: Your Legal Rights, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Feb. 17, 2018, 
4:32 PM), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/mental_health.cfm; Mental Health 
Conditions in the Workplace and the ADA, ADA NAT’L NETWORK (Feb. 17, 2018, 4:32 PM), 
https://adata.org/factsheet/health; Succeeding at Work, NAT’L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS 
(Feb. 17, 2018, 4:32 PM), https://www.nami.org/Find-Support/Living-with-a-Mental-
Health-Condition/Succeeding-at-Work. Because individuals that meet Oklahoma’s 
definition of “assisted outpatient” either needed inpatient care in the last thirty-six months or 
acted violently one or more times in the last twenty-four months, individuals that meet the 
definition of “assisted outpatient” are more likely than many other individuals with mental 
illness to struggle to maintain steady employment. See 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20)(d) 
(2011). 
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Oklahoma’s statute on patient rights in the mental health context 
explicitly outlines a “right to counsel, including court-appointed counsel . . . 
to represent the person at no cost if the person is an indigent person and 
cannot afford an attorney.”97 However, the statute unfortunately limits this 
right to “persons requiring treatment,” which is defined to refer specifically 
to a person who meets the criteria for inpatient commitment.98 Therefore, a 
person who meets the criteria for involuntary outpatient commitment only 
has a statutory right to a court-appointed attorney once they have 
deteriorated to the point that they may be involuntarily committed to 
inpatient treatment. Because the individuals who are the prime focus of 
Oklahoma’s involuntary outpatient commitment statute do not have a 
statutory right to a court-appointed attorney, and these same individuals 
have experienced cyclical periods of hospitalization or violence that likely 
reduced their ability to hold steady employment, it is very likely that these 
individuals may be forced to rely on their family to provide them with legal 
counsel—if they obtain legal counsel at all. Because these individuals may 
struggle with mental deterioration, have no right to court-appointed 
counsel, and may feel quite differently about their treatment than their 
family and friends do, questioning the way Oklahoma’s involuntary 
outpatient commitment statute allocates power between the “assisted 
outpatient” and their family and friends is essential.  
Oklahoma’s involuntary outpatient commitment statutes evidence the 
central support role family and friends have in mental health treatment. 
During the process of obtaining an outpatient commitment order, a licensed 
mental health professional must create a written treatment plan.99 The 
statute expressly states that the mental health professional must allow 
certain people to participate in the development of the treatment plan, 
including the assisted outpatient, the treating physician, the treatment 
advocate, and “[a]n individual significant to the assisted outpatient, 
including any relative, close friend, or individual otherwise concerned with 
the welfare of the assisted outpatient, upon the request of the assisted 
outpatient.”100  
Although an individual may request that their family member or friend 
be involved in developing their treatment plan, it does not necessarily 
follow that the individual being ordered to outpatient treatment and their 
friends or family will always agree on what type of treatment is appropriate. 
                                                                                                                 
 97. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-411(A)(2) (2011). 
 98. Id. § 5-411(A); id. § 1-103(13). 
 99. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-416(G) (Supp. 2016). 
 100. Id. § 5-416(G)(4). 
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After all, involuntary outpatient commitment was developed to treat 
individuals with a history of both violence and treatment non-compliance 
who are unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment.101 It is 
understandable that the family and friends surrounding these individuals 
might desire more legal and medical options that give them the power to 
intervene before their loved one becomes imminently, rather than remotely 
dangerous. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that “family-oriented 
advocacy groups generally favor an approach to [involuntary outpatient 
commitment] that loosens the commitment criteria, thereby expanding the 
number of persons subject to commitment.”102 However, using involuntary 
outpatient commitment to prevent an individual from deteriorating to the 
point that they meet the “mentally ill and dangerous” inpatient criteria 
might mean forcibly medicating an individual who is not imminently 
dangerous. 
This power dynamic raises issues concerning the criteria that family and 
courts should use to determine when forcible medication is in the best 
interest of the individual ordered to involuntary outpatient treatment. 
Theoretically, an individual who is not imminently dangerous may be able 
to refuse medication for reasons that elevate personal desire or fulfillment 
over adherence to social norms. For example, an individual with a mental 
illness might find that their mental illness enables them to be more creative 
or that their mental illness is somehow a part of themselves that they do not 
wish to suppress.103 If the person is not dangerous, they have the right to 
weigh these considerations and decide whether to refuse medication. 
However, when an individual with mental illness does not have counsel and 
is being represented by family or friends who weigh these considerations 
differently than the individual does, laws like Oklahoma’s that purport to 
confer more enforcement power than they actually do may become 
problematic. Under such involuntary outpatient treatment statutes, states 
lack enforcement power when patients violate court orders. As a result, 
when an individual wishes to refuse treatment these statutes may allow 
                                                                                                                 
 101. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 1-103(20) (2011). 
 102. Geraldine A. McCafferty & Jeanne Dooley, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: 
An Update, 14 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 277, 277 (1990). 
 103. See Humans of New York, Escaped Again, FACEBOOK (Dec. 28, 2017, 5:51 PM), 
https://www.facebook.com/humansofnewyork/videos/2082415631832526/. This video 
contains an interview with a woman who was involuntarily ordered to inpatient treatment for 
schizophrenia, according to herself. Because of her religious beliefs, she did not wish to be 
treated and even “escaped” from the hospital to avoid treatment. In her opinion, 
schizophrenia is a fabricated disease and, as such, receiving treatment for it merely discredits 
her religious beliefs. 
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courts and family members that support involuntary treatment to create the 
sense that the individual has fewer options open to them than they actually 
do.  
VI. Conclusion 
Generally, involuntary outpatient commitment statutes subordinate the 
individual’s right to refuse treatment to society’s desire to prevent possible 
tragedy. The main benefit of these statutes is that they may reduce gaps in 
the care that “revolving door patients” experience by mandating medical 
treatment. The hope is that, by doing so, these statutes will prevent 
individuals from meeting the “mentally ill and dangerous” standard for 
inpatient commitment. The problem involuntary outpatient commitment 
statues run into, however, is that the constitutionality of such preventative 
measures appears uncertain when one considers Supreme Court precedent. 
If forced medication is not “essential” to prevent danger to the individual or 
to the public, then the individual has the right to refuse treatment.104 If the 
individual is imminently dangerous and meets the “mentally ill and 
dangerous” standard, it is more foreseeable that forced medication is 
“essential” to prevent harm. However, when the individual is only remotely 
dangerous, their mental illness might be currently controlled. Whether 
court-ordered medication is “essential” to prevent harm is more uncertain. 
By the very nature of involuntary outpatient commitment statues, deciding 
whether it is “essential” to forcefully medicate remotely dangerous 
individuals involves a prediction about future behavior. Because the danger 
is not imminent, it is less foreseeable. As a consequence, it is less clear that 
such statutes are constitutional under the standard set out in Riggins.105 
States appear to be aware that involuntary outpatient commitment 
statutes walk a fine line between ordering the medication of presently 
dangerous individuals and ordering the medication of individuals who have 
the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. For this reason, states 
have adopted statutes with limited enforcement mechanisms that allow 
individuals to refuse treatment without consequence. As long as states must 
operate without guidance from the United States Supreme Court, 
involuntary outpatient commitment statutes will continue to permit court-
ordered medication without permitting courts and mental health providers 
to enforcement treatment orders.  
                                                                                                                 
 104. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992). 
 105. See id. 
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While Oklahoma’s involuntary outpatient commitment statutes will 
likely give struggling families another option for treating difficult 
symptoms of mental illness, Oklahoma could certainly take steps to protect 
the rights of individuals who meet the definition of “assisted outpatient.” 
Although it will require money the state simply does not have, the 
Oklahoma Legislature should add “assisted outpatient” to the statute on 
patient rights so that those facing involuntary outpatient commitment have 
the right to court-appointed counsel.106 Doing so will ensure that individuals 
with mental illness have someone advocating for their wishes as well as 
someone who will explain the enforcement limitations of the statutes. 
While inpatient treatment is still the last safety net for Oklahoma’s most ill 
individuals, outpatient treatment has increasingly become the foundation of 
mental healthcare in Oklahoma and across the country. It is past time that 
we consider the constitutional protections due individuals facing forced 
outpatient treatment. 
 
Sarah K. Capps 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 106. 43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-411(A)(2) (2011). 
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